INTRODUCTION TO PANEL I
Gabriel M. Wilner*
The question of whether standards of international law should
determine or, at least, have some effect on the reaction of governments to internal conflicts occurring elsewhere is the subject of
much debate. Closely connected to conclusions reached in concrete
situations is the content of international law standards on intervention by states in internal conflicts.
It would seem that the principle of sovereignty would encourage
theories of non-intervention in the internal affairs of states; it is in
the mutual interest of governments that they not interfere with
each other's political affairs since most states are vulnerable to
possible outside pressures. Intervention can promote the destabilization of national governmental structures, particularly if the
government in power is not the only political grouping in the country on whom the particular version of the theory of intervention
bestows the right to benefit from intervention. Non-intervention
will discourage instability.
However, another argument favoring non-intervention takes a
different direction. Friedmann, in his book The Changing Structure of International Law, suggested the following:
What on balance favors the view that in a civil war the two
sides are to be treated on a par, is the consideration that international law should not be used to prevent social change. The organization of international society is still based on national states,
and in our time conflicts of ideologies as well as the emancipation
of many colonized countries cause political and social upheavals
on a very large scale. Outside intervention would tend to aggravate the conflict and provoke counter-intervention. Politically,
such interventions are sometimes unavoidable, as recent history
shows. But the cause of international law is not served by invoking it in support of intervention in political strife.'
The approach which amounts to a standard of "just" intervention has been invoked for any number of reasons. Perceived
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threats to the political or ideological security of the intervening
state account for many of the actual cases of intervention. However, "just" intervention is often based on goals that have received
general international approval, such as anti-colonialism, self-determination, and the implementation of human rights. Further, the
intervention has been considered "just" when an internal situation
such as that in South Africa leads to actions so contrary to values
in the region that it is considered to be a threat to peace.
The justification, or even the obligation, of a state to intervene
because another state has or may intervene in an internal conflict
is a variation on the "just" intervention concept since it is often
couched in ideological terms.
The work of this panel is to sort out the theories and arguments
on the obligations of individual states, as distinguished from the
international or regional community of states acting under the
rules of an international organization, in dealing with internal conflicts in other states. Are states assisted in determining their obligations by existing standards of international law? The panel will
wish to address itself to the central question of the content of international law standards on intervention. In doing so it may also
wish to offer some definition of "internal conflict" and discuss the
ramifications of the passage from internal to international
conflicts.

